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Abstract. Developments in Blockchain technology have enabled the
creation of smart contracts; i.e., self-executing code that is stored and
executed on the Blockchain. This has led to the creation of distributed,
decentralised applications, along with frameworks for developing and de-
ploying them easily. This paper describes a proof-of-concept system that
implements a distributed online marketplace using the Ethereum frame-
work, where buyers and sellers can engage in e-commerce transactions
without the need of a large central entity coordinating the process. The
performance of the system was measured in terms of cost of use through
the concept of ’gas usage’. It was determined that such costs are sig-
nificantly less than that of Amazon and eBay for high volume users.
The findings generally support the ability to use Ethereum to create a
distributed on-chain market, however, there are still areas that require
further research and development.
Keywords: Blockchain · Smart Contract · Ethereum · E-Commerce ·
Distributed Systems
1 Introduction
In order to exchange physical goods online, internet users utilise third party
marketplaces to mitigate some of the associated risks of trading with unknown
Internet users and to also facilitate the processing of the financial transaction.
Buyers and sellers expect that the third party marketplace will act as a trusted
intermediary and provide the service of connecting and protecting peers wishing
to exchange goods, in exchange for a fee that is likely a percentage cut of the
transaction. Despite these protections, reported instances of non-payment and
non-delivery crimes amounted to over $138 million in losses for victims in the
USA in 2016 [14].
The use of extremely large and reputable marketplaces, such as eBay and
Amazon, offer better protection to users from retail fraud than small, unknown
alternative marketplaces, however this in turn creates powerful centralised cor-
porations with vast quantities of personal information about users, which can
be processed and sold [19]. Recent events have brought to light the issue of data
privacy, creating wide spread concern regarding the collection and use of user
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data by large corporations [11]. Alongside this are concerns regarding the secu-
rity of our sensitive financial information online. Again, recent events such as
the Equifax data breach have highlighted the risks of sharing financial infor-
mation, even with large, previously trusted financial corporations [7]. In order
to exchange currency online users must provide sensitive personal and banking
information, exposing their data to the risk of a data breach and thus exposing
the user to the risk of identity theft. Large marketplaces pose a double threat
of information security to users, as users must expose both their personal infor-
mation, that is valuable for the study and manipulation of populations through
big data analysis, as well as their banking information which could be used for
identity theft, should it be compromised.
Recent developments in Blockchain technology have enabled the creation of
Smart Contracts, self-executing contracts that are stored and executed on the
Blockchain nodes, allowing secure decentralised applications to be developed.
Buterin et al. [8] suggest many applications for smart contracts, including on-
chain decentralised marketplaces, however they provides no details on such an
application. By using Smart Contracts to create an on-chain decentralised mar-
ketplace, the requirement of a large central entity to co-ordinate the marketplace
functions are removed, which in turn provides a method to remove data aggre-
gation and user exposure to the threats posed.
The contribution of the paper is threefold. First, it reports on the design and
implementation of blockchain technology for a distributed physical goods mar-
ketplace application, in order to enable trading of goods without the requirement
of a trusted third party market operator using the Ethereum framework. Sec-
ond, it evaluates the developed proof-of-concept marketplace system in terms of
performance, based on gas used for computation by the smart contracts on the
blockchain, and scalability. Third, it discusses issues and insights gained which
give directions to future research & development.
The reminder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides back-
ground on traditional online marketplaces, related work and the Ethereum frame-
work. Section 3 enumerates requirements for online marketplaces and presents
the architecture of the proof-of-concept system. Section 4 elaborates on the as-
pects of the developed system and the testing performed. Section 5 evaluates
the system in terms of performance and scalability, while Section 6 provides dis-
cussion based on the work done, issues faced and suggestions for future work.
Finally, Section 7 draws conclusions.
2 Background
This section reviews (in Section 2.1) current online commerce and the tech-
nologies employed by existing centralised marketplaces to facilitate the online
exchange of goods and services , despite the prevalence of fraud and other risks
faced by online peers. Following this related work is discussed to provide a basis
for our design. It also reviews the Ethereum framework (in Section 2.3), which
is used to implement the decentralised marketplace proof-of-concept system.
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2.1 Online Commerce
While online commerce provides convenience to consumers, online retail fraud is
one of the top three crime types reported in the United States of America with
losses of $138 million for victims in the US in 2016 [14]. These losses are for
non-payment or non-delivery of goods exchanged between online peers, which
highlights the risks faced by both buyer and sellers in online marketplaces.
To combat the increased opportunity for fraud that exists on the trustless
web, a number of legal and technological solutions are employed. A number of
these solutions will now be detailed.
Centralised marketplaces. Centralised marketplaces act as an interme-
diary between buyers and sellers, helping to facilitate the exchange of goods
for currency. A peer is able to list an item for sale, which another peer is then
able to purchase in exchange for currency via a payment provider like PayPal
or a credit card provider like VISA. Consumers may mitigate the risk of fraud
by using large trusted online retailers or marketplaces such as Amazon or eBay.
Even when making purchases from third parties via these large marketplaces, the
marketplace acts as an intermediary between the consumer and seller, mediating
any disputes that may arise from the transaction.
Escrow services. A more traditional form of intermediary that can be
utilised are escrow services. In this process, the buyer and seller agree upon
a mutually trusted third party, that will be responsible for the funds until the
conditions of the transaction, as agreed upon by all parties, have been met.
Should any dispute arise the third party will provide arbitration and attempt
to resolve the dispute. However as shown by Grazioli and Jarvenpaa [16], most
users are unable to distinguish fraudulent websites, leaving consumers open to
fraudulent online escrow services.
Reputation Systems. Many online marketplaces, including Amazon and
eBay, provide reputation systems which provide a metric for users to judge one
another and determine the risk of partaking in an exchange with another par-
ticular user. These trust and reputation systems are being used successfully by
online commercial applications to promote good behaviour by users [18]. Resnick
and Zeckhauser [25] report that reputation profiles used on eBay were predic-
tive of future performance and they found that users participate in reputation
systems the majority of the time, despite the incentives to free ride.
2.2 Related Work
Subramanian [27] provides an analysis of decentralised marketplaces on the
blockchain based on the current theory and literature. He identifies advantages
of using blockchain-based marketplaces to include, faster transaction times, re-
duced costs and increased privacy and security for users. He also provides an
analysis of the decentralisation possibility for various product and service cat-
egories, including physical products which he states may only achieve partial
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decentralisation due to the complexities of providing decentralised B2B support,
accounting, payment and reputation systems.
Notheisen, Cholewa, and Shanmugam [23] implemented a real-world asset
marketplace with a private blockchain, using the ethereum framework to create
a digital motor vehicle asset register. The system provides automated transfer
of ownership along with immutable records of vehicle history. The study also in-
troduced methods to reduce the risk arising from the immutability of blockchain
transactions. By providing abort mechanisms, both buyer and seller may disen-
gage from the transaction before final confirmation and exchange of funds and
property. The application shifts the centralisation onto a single government au-
thority to provide verification of vehicle information and condition, however it’s
benefits provide a system that requires less work to participate in and maintain
compared to existing vehicle registration methods.
Mobius [20] provides protocols for smart markets however the aim is more
specifically for providing a marketplace for autonomous agents to trade data and
micro services, specifically with the world of IoT in mind.
Nasonov et al. [21] propose a big data platform that companies can use to sell,
exchange and process Big Data sets. Such an application would provide a valu-
able mechanism for companies to improve their business organisation through
the application of knowledge extracted from such data sets.
Eskandari et al. [13] studied the possibility of using smart contracts to im-
plement a derivatives market that would remove the need for an intermediary
broker. They highlight gaps in the current infrastructure, stopping the devel-
opment of secure and autonomous derivatives markets, particularly the lack of
decentralised data feeds, as this may lead to potential vulnerabilities should
centralised feeds become compromised. They also highlight issues raised by new
development concepts such as gas usage, and limiting the gas usage during com-
putation.
2.3 Ethereum
Ethereum extends the application of the blockchain technology used by Bitcoin
to provide a Turing complete scripting language. Scripts can be committed to
the blockchain via transactions, indefinitely making them publicly accessible.
This enables the ability to encode arbitrary state transition functions, and as
such the ability to create decentralised blockchain-based applications, otherwise
known as Dapps.
Smart Contracts. The Turing-complete scripting language incorporated
into Ethereum allows for the creation of smart contracts as envisioned by Sz-
abo [29]. Scripts can be included within transactions as in Bitcoin, however
contracts also have their own addresses that can send and receive transactions,
allowing parts of the contract to be executed upon receiving a transaction. Smart
contracts are able to communicate with one another through messages allowing
for complex interactions to be developed such as Decentralised Autonomous Or-
ganisations [9].
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Ether and Gas. Gas, which is directly exchangeable for Ether (ETH) at
a consistent real price, is the unit used to fuel the computations of byte-code
within the EVM and storage of data on the blockchain. The use of a resource
to fuel contracts protects from malicious and infinitely looping code from being
executed on the chain without the cost of computation being paid for.
Contracts and transactions have a fixed start price to pay the miner for his
computational power. Each specific computation also has predefined gas costs,
such as additions, subtractions, memory stores and retrievals, as such the total
cost of computation can be estimated on compilation of the code. However as
ethereum is still being developed, changes could cause the gas cost of a contract
function to change.
3 System Design
To effectively investigate the research question, an adaptation of the Design
Science Research (DSR) methodology set out by Vaishnavi and Kuechler [30] will
be used. This process involves investigating a known problem through the design
and creation of an artefact, which can then be evaluated through discussion and
reflection as a potential solution to the original problem.
The intent is to provide a system for the trading of physical goods similar
to eBay, meaning that both the physical characteristics and the value of the
goods will be extremely varied. As such the automatic verification of physical
exchange of goods is a problem beyond the scope of what is currently achievable
by this paper. In order to resolve disputes during exchange, such as non-delivery,
misrepresented goods or fraudulent claims, some form of centralisation will be
required, such as an escrow and arbitration process.
We used abstract story-like descriptions using non-technical language to de-
fine the required behaviour of the system, inspired by Agile software develop-
ment [24]. Table 1 contains a list of user stories from the perspective of the
various user types of the application. The users are subdivided into ”Buyers”,
those wishing to purchase items, and ”Sellers”, those wishing to list and sell
items. These requirements are identified using a sequential numbering Rn to
provide easy referencing.
The application is designed to have a back-end consisting of two Solid-
ity smart contracts hosted on the Ethereum public blockchain, along with a
HTML/CSS/JS front end UI application. The web application will use the web3
API to interact with the smart contracts. Figure 1 provides a diagram of the
systems architecture.
3.1 Back-end
The back-end will consist of two smart contracts written in Solidity, the Market-
place Agent contract and the Escrow Agent contract. Each will act as a sort of
repository for the business data they are required to administer and store, with
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Table 1. User Stories encompassing the requirements of the blockchain-based dis-
tributed marketpkace system.
ID User Story
R1 As a seller I am able to list items for sale with a listing name and price in
Ether.
R2 As the seller of a purchased listing, I am able to approve the linked escrow for
the aforementioned listing.
R3 As the seller of a purchased listing, my ethereum account is funded with the
proceeds of a sale once the buyer has approved/finalised the linked escrow,
once the listed goods have exchanged possession.
R4 As a buyer I am able to browse existing listing for sale.
R5 As a buyer I am able to purchase an available listing.
R6 As a buyer I am able to fund an escrow for the purchase of a listing.
R7 As the buyer of a listing, I am able to approve the linked escrow for the
aforementioned listing.
R8 As the buyer or seller of a listing, I am able to request and receive impartial
mediation of an escrow in the event of a issue with the exchange of goods.
Fig. 1. System Architecture
their implementation based on the pattern described by Hitchins [17]. These
contracts will now be further described.
Marketplace Contract. The marketplace contract will provide the business
logic which orchestrates the process of listing, browsing and purchasing of items.
It will also handle the logistical information exchange between a buyer and a
seller required to enable the logistics of a physical exchange.
Escrow Agent Contract. The escrow contract will provide the business
logic to reduce and mitigate risk for both buyers and sellers in the exchange of
physical goods over the internet. This logic will form an escrow contract between
Blockchain-based Distributed Marketplace 7
the buyer and seller that is paid out automatically in the event that both the
buyer and seller approve the escrow. Logic for disputing the escrow will also be
provided, in which case the escrow can be paid out by an arbitrator to either
the buyer or the seller.
3.2 Front-end
While the smart contracts provide all the business logic of a marketplace, using
them via an API would not be user friendly and as such a JavaScript web
application will be implemented to provide a front-end that can be accessed via
a web browser.
The front-end of the marketplace will consist of a typical web application.
This will be comprised of a JavaScript application that utilises the Web3 API
to interact with both the marketplace and escrow contracts along with HTML
pages to provide a graphical user interface.
4 System Implementation
The requirements R1-R8 (Table 1) were processed into a Kanban style to-do list,
allowing the development of the application in a Behaviour-Driven Development
(BDD) fashion [26] This allowed the developer to better react to an evolving
understanding of the development processes and methods within the Ethereum
framework. The development environment consisted of the components and tools
enumerated in Table 2.
The architecture of the smart contract implementation is described by the
UML diagram of Figure 2. The source code for the components which com-
pose the architecture of the system shown in Figure 1, i.e. the Marketplace and
Escrow Agent contracts, the ”browser listing page”, ”view listing page”, ”user
listing/listing creation page”, and ”user orders page” can be found on GitHub:
https://github.com/Howserr/onchain-market.
5 System Evaluation
The proof-of-concept system has been tested and evaluated in terms of white-
box testing, black-box testing [22] and cost of use for users. Test scripts and full
results are also available on GitHub.
White-box Testing. A suite of 74 unit tests were created during devel-
opment to provide white box test coverage of both smart contracts, Market-
placeAgent and EscrowAgent. These tests were organised as BDD structures
using the Mocha architecture. Naming of the groups and individual tests fol-
lowed the behavioural language style of ”given, when, then”. These tests were
created to run using the Truﬄe testing framework which runs against a local
in-memory blockchain, i.e., Ganache.
Black-box Testing. A set of 8 test cases were created to meet the require-
ments R1-R8; all of the test cases were successful except the script for R8, the
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Table 2. Tools used for the implementation of the proof-of-concept system
Software Version Purpose
Web3 1.0 Provides a JavaScript API for Ethereum blockchains by im-
plementing the Ethereum JSON RPC API; it allows front-
end web applications to interact with blockchains.
Ganache 1.1.0 Ethereum blockchain JavaScript implementation which runs
in-memory; it removes the need for a local blockchain client
for local testing and provides additional tools to aid in de-
velopment of smart contracts.
Truﬄe 4.1.7 Part of Ethereum development framework which provides a
compilation, testing and deployment pipeline for Dapp de-
velopers.
Mocha 5..0 Included as part of Truﬄe in order to provide a unit testing
framework for Solidity contract code/
MetaMask 4.5.5 Extension for the Chrome web browser that enables interac-
tion with the Ethereum blockchain, as required for the use
of Dapps.
NodeJS 8.11.1 Provides a development framework for Truﬄe and enables
use of NPM, the NodeJS package manager, for the installa-
tion of JavaScript dependencies
Fig. 2. Smart Contracts UML Diagram
ability for an arbitrator to provide arbitration of a disputed listing/escrow. This
test failed because the front-end functionality for arbitrators was not imple-
mented due to security issues created by the single arbitrator solution of our
artefact. This problem, along with potential solutions, is discussed further in
Section 6.
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Performance Testing. This section presents the results of performance
testing the implemented artefact in terms of the costs of use. The quantity of
gas used by each action that requires sending a transaction to the blockchain
was recorded using Ganache. In order to calculate a cost based on the gas used,
the exchange price of gas was determined to be 1 gwei per unit. This exchange
price is based on the current Gas Price Standard at ETH Gas Station [1]. The
costs of use for the artefact are displayed in Table 3.
It should be noted that the execution of Solidity code is deterministic and the
gas used is calculated as the sum of the gas used by the EVM opcodes executed.
As such measurements of gas usage were not repeated.
The costs for selling on Amazon and eBay were calculated based on the pric-
ing models detailed on their seller information pages [3, 2].The calculations were
based on an item in the Consumer Electronics category, the second most prefer-
able category of goods to buy online [4]. In both cases we used the cheapest fee
structure available, those targeted at sellers running online stores, however the
subscription cost is not included in the calculation. For Amazon the consumer
electronics referral fee percentage of 8% (minimum $1.00) was used and conse-
quently it would be a non-media item so no closing fee is charged. As such, the
cost to sell an item on Amazon given the stated assumptions, is 8% of the listing
price. The cost to sell an item on eBay given the same assumptions is 10% of
the total value of sale. The results of these calculations are displayed in Table 4.
Table 3. Combined buyer and seller use costs of listing and selling an item in Gas,
ETH and USD (rounded up to 2 decimal places).
Behaviour Gas Cost ETH Cost USD Cost
Add Listing 163192 0.0001632 $0.07
Purchase Listing 237384 0.0002374 $0.10
First Approval (seller) 45524 0.0000455 $0.02
Second Approval (buyer) 37050 0.0000370 $0.02
Total Cost 483150 0.004831 $0.21
Table 4. The costs of selling items of specific prices on popular online marketplaces
in USD.
Item Price Amazon Cost eBay Cost
$10 $1.00 $1.00
$50 $4.00 $5.00
$100 $8.00 $10.00
$1000 $80.00 $100.00
Comparison. By comparing Tables 3 & 4 it can be seen that the combined
cost of both a buyer and seller for selling an item using the artefact will be
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significantly lower than the costs of selling even a $10 item on either Amazon
or eBay. As the costs of usage for the artefact are based on the gas used rather
than a marketplace commission, the costs would not scale based on the price of
the item being exchanged as it would on Amazon or eBay.
6 Discussion
This section discusses issues faced during implementation of the artefact, and
suggests future work.
6.1 Escrow Arbitration
Our initial design intent was to use a similar system to that employed by existing
marketplaces, in which administrative members of the marketplace community
would take turns to fulfil the role of arbitrator when required. During the de-
velopment phase it became obvious that the planned method of arbitration was
fundamentally flawed when used within a decentralised system as it creates cen-
tralisation and a requirement of trust in a closed group of administrators. As
such this requirement was not fulfilled and instead we suggest it as a subject for
further study. Insights into the problem based on the current literature will now
be provided.
Group Escrow. The use of group escrow protocols in order to facilitate the
exchange of physical goods using cryptocurrencies has been studied previously
[15]. A protocol using group escrow techniques could be developed in order to
solve the requirement of trust in a single arbitrator. A number of arbitrators
would be selected from a pool of registered arbitrators who would then indi-
vidually review the available information pertaining to the exchange of goods
and vote on the party to which the balance of the escrow should be awarded to.
This then presents the problem of finding consensus between the arbitrators, a
problem which the literature provides many potential avenues for solution.
Proof-of-Stake Consensus The Casper Proof-of-Stake protocol being de-
veloped as a replacement for Proof-of-Work by the Ethereum Foundation [10]
provides potential solutions for encouraging good peer behaviour within a con-
sensus system. Aspects of this protocol could be applied to group arbitration
such as by requiring would-be arbitrators to stake Ether. By doing this, the
stake of malicious actors can be slashed, in order to create a disincentive to such
behaviour, while arbitrators that form the majority could be rewarded with a
share of a fee charged as part of the arbitration process, when it is requested.
The shared fee would be collected from the balance of the escrow.
Such an arbitration protocol would reduce the potential impact of malicious
actors within the centralised process. It could be utilised as a separate arbitration
service for many forms of transaction within applications on the decentralised
web.
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6.2 Logistics Integration
During an online exchange of physical goods the logistics of the physical exchange
are likely to involve a logistics carrier due to the potential distances. Currently
the system has no functionality to help peers organise this crucial part of the
exchange of goods, or to help arbitrators understand the current state of the
logistic process of the exchange. By introducing the ability for courier logs to be
recorded against an escrow, the state of the exchange could be better tracked
providing arbitrators with rich information to better perform their role, reducing
the risk of participation for good peers. Logistical updates could be made via
an interaction with the smart contract from the logistics provider, which would
of course require their co-operation. However, such functionality would require
authorised access such that logistic logs on the escrow could not be fraudulently
created by anyone but the logistics provider; else the logs would no longer be
dependable for arbitration. In order to provide authorisation to update logistics
logs, logistic providers would need to have an Ethereum account verified and
approved for access to the specific escrow. This creates the requirements for a
process to verify that a given Ethereum account belongs to a specific and legiti-
mate logistics provider. The integration of logistical elements into a distributed
on-chain marketplace provides an opportunity for further work.
6.3 Reputation System
The introduction of an eBay style reputation system would help sellers and
buyers to better identify safe, low risk peers to exchange goods with [18]. An
average of a users feedback scores could be displayed as part of their profile to
help peers better judge the risk of potential exchanges.
An alternative option would be to use a reputation system protocol designed
for peer-to-peer networks. Swamynathan et al. [28] suggest such a system to
address user collusion and short-lived online identities, the main causes of erro-
neous and misleading values in reputation systems. A similar reputation system
that is blockchain based was introduced by Dennis and Owen [12], however no
implementation currently exists for practical use.
6.4 Decentralised Front-end Hosting
The developed implementation is a locally deployed proof of concept artefact,
however any real marketplace would be required to be publicly accessible. The
back-end of the application, the smart contracts, would be hosted on the blockchain,
however the front-end is a standard web application and so requires a web host-
ing solution. The simplest solution would be to use a standard web hosting
service, however this would centralise the front-end and drastically reduce the
points of failure required to make the application inaccessible. Decentralised web
hosting options are under development, such as the IPFS peer-to-peer hyperme-
dia protocol [6] or the ethereum foundation developed Swarm [5], a peer-to-peer
storage and content distribution platform. However at the current time, while
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both are available to use, development of the systems is still ongoing and as such
neither would be suitable for production environment use. Works to study the
deployment of a Dapp front-end to a decentralised hosting platform should be
undertaken.
7 Conclusion
To evaluate the applicability of an on-chain marketplace for physical goods, first
the current blockchain literature was reviewed and then an proof-of-concept
artefact was designed. The artefact was implemented to meet the basic require-
ments of a physical goods marketplace, captured in 8 requirements (R1–R8).
It was then successfully tested against the requirements using white box and
black box testing to verify the software. Performance measurements were taken
regarding the gas usage of various behaviours of the marketplace, which were
analysed against figures from existing centralised marketplaces. Our successful
acceptance testing and performance testing of the artefact provides a demon-
stration of the Ethereum framework’s testing and quality assurance capabilities
– a key requirement for production applications. Discussion of the shortcomings
of the generated artefact were presented, such as the vulnerabilities of a single
escrow arbitrator and the difficulties regarding integrating logistics information
and logs. Ultimately, it was concluded that an on-chain marketplace is indeed
feasible, however, further study and development of the technology is required
before a production implementation becomes practical.
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